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1 Introduction
This study aims at contributing to a better understanding of the impact of changes in
international credit market integration on the real economy. Previous literature shows
that financial integration alleviates the financing constraints of firms (e.g. Harris et al.
1994, Gallego and Loayza 2001), with some studies finding that small firms can especially
benefit from credit market liberalization (Gelos and Werner 2002, Laeven 2002). Given
that the global financial crisis led to a considerable retrenchment in international capital
flows, our goal is to investigate how the reduction in cross-border bank lending affected
the access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the implications of credit market fragmen-
tation for SMEs within the euro area, while other studies focus on developing or emerging
economies. In contrast to previous studies, the question we ask here is whether the drop
in foreign lending since the crisis - both in the form of direct cross-border credit and in the
form of lending via foreign affiliates - has increased borrowing costs for firms. Indeed, our
regression results indicate that firms in countries that experienced sharper reductions in
cross-border credit inflows were more likely to see their credit costs rise. When comparing
the importance of credit inflows to banks and to non-banks for this effect, we find that it
is mainly the fragmentation of the interbank credit market that drives the negative link
between cross-border credit and credit costs of SMEs in the euro area.
Several studies show that credit markets have become more fragmented since the
crisis (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011, Bruno and Shin 2013, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011,
Lane 2013, 2014a,b, Bremus and Fratzscher 2015), and that the decline in cross-border
bank lending is particularly pronounced and persistent in the euro area. According to
Wehinger (2013), SMEs are particularly affected by financial fragmentation.1 Overall, in
the euro area, new bank credit to small firms declined by 35 percent between 2008 and
2013, with SMEs reporting deteriorating credit availability in many euro area countries
(Figure 1). Regarding SMEs’ costs of funding, although average loan rates for firms
have decreased since 2012, the spreads between loan rates for small and large loans have
increased significantly (Figures 2), especially in those countries hit hardest by the crisis.
Owing to the fact that firms in the euro area are highly dependent on bank financing,
tight credit market conditions can importantly limit their access to external finance. As
1Reasons for the borrowing limits faced by small firms include their opaqueness and, hence, the larger
information asymmetries between banks and small firms compared to larger and listed firms for which
hard information is readily available.
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SMEs make up for more than 98 percent of non-financial firms in the EU, about 60 percent
of gross value added, and nearly 70 percent of employment, their credit conditions play
an important role for investment, innovation, and growth in the euro area.
Combining firm-level with macroeconomic data, we run probit regressions to test diffe-
rent channels through which credit market fragmentation affects the financing constraints
of SMEs. External financing costs are measured using micro-level data from the Survey
on Access to Finance of Enterprises in the Euro Area (SAFE). The SAFE data contain
information on borrowing conditions and business characteristics of European SMEs. Ag-
gregate credit data come from the International Banking Statistics and from the Statistics
on Credit to the Private Sector provided by the Bank for International Settlements.
The data reveal that access to finance was, indeed, among the most pressing problems
for SMEs in the euro area in the aftermath of the crisis (Figure 3). However, there are
pronounced differences across countries. Not surprisingly, access to finance is particularly
problematic in the periphery countries. In contrast, only about six percent of German
firms listed access to finance as their most pressing problem at the end of 2013. These
differences across countries potentially point to a strong fragmentation of credit markets
in the euro area, with capital not necessarily flowing to where it can be employed most
fruitfully. Our regression analysis examines this issue in more detail by looking at the
impact of changes in cross-border credit flows on firms’ financing costs.
Credit market segmentation can affect firms’ access to finance through different chan-
nels. First, a decline in credit inflows from abroad can increase financing costs because
of reduced direct cross-border lending to firms (at arms-length or through foreign affili-
ates). As shown by firm-level survey-data from the EFIGE project for seven European
countries,2 on average, about eight percent of SMEs used foreign bank credit in 2008/09.
However, there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity across countries. Whereas ne-
arly 15 percent of French SMEs used services by foreign banks, less than five percent of
German SMEs did so.
Second - even if individual firms do not have a direct relationship with foreign banks
- a decrease in foreign credit inflows has indirect effects on the firm’s financing conditions
through its impact on the domestic credit market. On the one hand, contestability and,
hence, competitive pressures in the domestic banking sector decrease due to fragmentation
- with potentially adverse effects on the retail credit market. Consequently, banks may
charge higher lending rates to their clients (Bremus 2015, de Blas and Russ 2013). On the
2Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom. For more details, see Altomonte
and Aquilante (2012).
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other hand, credit market fragmentation can reduce domestic lending if the (wholesale)
funding conditions of domestic banks deteriorate (Feyen et al. 2014, Brei 2007) as cross-
border interbank credit becomes scarce. For the case of Turkey, Baskaya et al. (2017) find
a positive link between the credit supply of domestic banks that have a higher share of
wholesale liabilities and capital inflows. Hence, wholesale and interbank funding seems to
be an important transmission channel of global credit cycles.
Our estimation results indicate, first, that SMEs in countries experiencing stronger
reductions in cross-border bank lending are more likely to face increasing loan rates.
This relationship is meaningful both statistically and economically. Second, the negative
link between cross-border credit growth and financing costs of SMEs seems to be driven
primarily by the interbank lending channel. The stronger the reduction in cross-border
credit to the banking system, the more likely firms are to see their loan rates rise. Yet,
the impact of direct cross-border lending from banks to firms is statistically insignificant
in our setup.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss
how our study is related to previous literature. Section 3 gives a detailed overview of the
data employed and the empirical methodology used. Section 4 presents the regression
results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis is related to two main strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on external financing constraints of small firms. Several studies use survey
information on the perceived and actual financing obstacles reported by firms, e.g. from
the World Business Environment Survey (Beck et al. 2006, Beck et al. 2008, Coluzzi et
al. 2012), from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS),
or, more recently, from the SAFE.
Using SAFE data for the 2009-2011 period, Ferrando and Mulier (2015) present evi-
dence that less productive, more leveraged, and younger SMEs are more likely to face
external financing constraints. The authors argue that the global financial crisis is a good
starting point to study external financing constraints, as SMEs in the euro area were
likely to experience increased financing obstacles during the post-crisis period. In addi-
tion, the subsequent debt crisis in the euro area and the structural changes, especially
in the crisis-hit periphery countries, impaired the availability of external financing, espe-
cially for the more opaque SMEs. Artola and Genre (2011) use panel data from SAFE
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for the 2009-2010 period in order to study which firm characteristics affected the access
to finance of SMEs during the crisis. Their estimation results reveal that, in particular,
young and small firms have experienced credit constraints. In a cross-sectional analysis
of 2009, Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011) find that age and ownership are important dri-
vers of perceived financing constraints: older firms and firms owned by shareholders or
other firms are less financing constrained. Holton et al. (2014) explore the impact of the
crisis on credit supply and demand using SAFE data for 2009 to 2011 for the EU. They
show that banks tightened lending standards, but that credit demand by SMEs was also
reduced.
In a study relying on the BEEPS data for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Beck et
al. (2014) present evidence that banks’ lending techniques matter for credit constraints
of SMEs. They show that relationship lending reduces financing constraints in cyclical
downturns, but not in booms. Using confidential micro-data on Portuguese banks and
firms, Iyer et al. (2014) look at the effect that the drying up of the interbank market had
on loan availability for firms. They find that smaller firms especially had problems in
accessing finance due to reductions in interbank lending. Furthermore, small firms were
not able to substitute banks loans with other sources of finance.
Apart from survey data, a large set of studies exploit firm balance sheet information in
order to measure financing constraints by the sensitivity of investment to cash-flow. The
idea is that financially constrained firms are more cash-flow sensitive than unconstrained
firms. That is, constrained firms must rely more on internal funding (Fazzari and Petersen
1993). Yet, cash-flow sensitivity as a measure of financing constraints is criticized (Kaplan
and Zingales 1997, Kaplan and Zingales 2000). Following Almeida et al. (2004), several
papers alternatively measure firms’ financing obstacles by the cash flow sensitivity of
cash − a measure more focused on the financial situation of the firm than the cash-flow
sensitivity of investment. Based on the cash-flow sensitivity of cash, Baum et al. (2011)
find that the financial architecture is important for reducing the financing constraints of
small firms: bank-based systems tend to provide better access to finance for SMEs than
market-based systems in normal times. However, the authors point out that the results
may differ in crisis times. We contribute to this literature by addressing the question of
how changes in the degree of credit market integration affect the credit costs of SMEs in
the euro area.
A second - but smaller - strand of the literature is devoted to the link between cross-
border banking and the external financing constraints of small firms. While, among others,
Berger et al. (2001) and Mian (2006) show that foreign banks avoid lending to small and
opaque firms in developing countries, Clarke et al. (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005) find
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that foreign banks lend to small firms in developing and emerging economies at least as
much as domestic banks do. Other studies point in the same direction: After financial
liberalization, the cash-flow sensitivity of investment was reduced in Chile (Gallego and
Loayza 2001), Indonesia (Harris et al. 1994), and for small firms in Mexico (Gelos and
Werner 2002). Laeven (2002) studies the impact of financial liberalization on firms’ access
to finance using a panel of 13 developing countries over the 1988-1998 period. After libe-
ralization, small listed firms’ investment become less sensitive to changes in cash-flow, i.e.
firms become less financially constrained. However, large firms become more constrained
after liberalization - possibly due to preferential treatment before liberalization. In a si-
milar vein, Forbes (2007) presents evidence that smaller listed companies are more hurt
by the introduction of capital controls than larger ones.
Beck et al. (2011) explore bank-level survey evidence from 2006 to analyze to what
extent and under which conditions foreign and domestic banks lend to SMEs. Their
sample includes 11 large banks operating in advanced economies and 80 large banks
operating in developing countries. Against the conventional view that small, domestic
banks are more likely to give credit to SMEs, the authors present evidence that foreign
banks lend as much to SMEs as do domestic banks. Yet, foreign banks use different
lending techniques and organizational structures.
Giannetti and Ongena (2009) study the effects of foreign bank entry on young, small
Eastern European firms, both listed and unlisted. Using a linked micro-macro dataset,
they find that foreign bank presence fosters firms’ use of loans and reduces their cost of
debt. However, large firms benefit more from a foreign bank entry than do small firms.
Based on survey data for a set of Eastern European countries in 2005 and 2008, Popov and
Udell (2012) present evidence that, during the crisis, SMEs’ financing constraints were
affected by the deterioration of their banks’ financial health. In addition, they show that
the balance sheet weaknesses of foreign parent banks translated into financing obstacles
for SMEs.
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
In order to analyze the effects of the reduction in international bank lending on the
financing conditions of SMEs since the crisis, we use a linked micro-macro dataset for 11
euro area countries over the 2010−2014 period. Detailed information on the data used is
in the Data Appendix.
5
3.1 Micro-Level Data
Firm-level information on financial conditions in the euro area is provided by SAFE, from
the ECB. The survey covers a wide array of qualitative information on the access to finance
for non-financial firms in Europe; predominantly in the euro area. It is representative at
the euro-area level, as well as for the four largest countries Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain.
SAFE was started in 2009 and is conducted semi-annually. While ’wave 1’ (W1) of
each survey year covers the second and third quarter of that year, ’wave 2’ (W2) captures
the fourth quarter of the year and the first quarter of the following year. Therefore,
our sample covers the period 2010Q4−2014Q1 (i.e. 2010W2−2013W2). We only include
information starting with 2010W2 because previous waves covered considerably fewer
firms and relatively more firms from the largest four euro area countries. Each of the
survey rounds included here covers more than 5,000 firms. During the period under study,
the survey was conducted in so-called ECB waves and European Commission waves. The
ECB waves cover a limited number of euro area countries, whereas the Commission waves
cover all euro area countries and some surrounding countries.3 Given that we want to make
use of the time dimension in the data, we keep only those countries that are included in
all waves. These are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of
firms included in our regression sample by country and wave.
To achieve representativeness, the SAFE sample is stratified by country, firm size
class, and economic activity. The sample covers the following size classes: micro (1-9
employees), small (10-49 employees), and medium-sized (50-249 employees) enterprises.
For reasons of comparison, a sample of large enterprises (more than 250 employees) is
also included. In terms of economic activity, stratification is done at the one-digit level of
NACE rev.1.1. Economic activities include the four broad sectoral categories of Industry,
Construction, Trade, and Services.4
Table 2 provides a detailed overview of the distribution of firms according to different
characteristics. With respect to firm size, three quarters of firms in the sample employ
3For a detailed overview over the countries covered in the different waves, see ECB (2014).
4Industry includes: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
supply; water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Trade: wholesale and
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal household goods; and Services: enterprises
in transport and storage; accommodation and food service activities; information and communication;
real estate activities; professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service
activities; arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities.
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less than 50 workers, and about 50 percent of firms have an annual turnover of less than
two million euros. The most important sectors are Services (37 percent of firms) and
Trade (28 percent). Interestingly, although the majority of firms is very small, nearly 80
percent of the firms are at least 10 years old. Regarding ownership, more than 80 percent
of firms belong to families or an individual person.
Firms’ credit costs. Our main focus is on changes in firms’ cost of external financing.
The SAFE data reveal that European SMEs frequently use bank loans as well as overdrafts
and credit lines as a means of external funding. In our sample, an average of about 40
percent of SMEs in the euro area rely on these bank-intermediated funding sources. Again,
reliance on different financing instruments varies significantly across countries. Yet, bank
credit and overdrafts rank among the most important external funding sources.
SAFE question Q10, which asks about the firm’s change in loan rates, is used in
order to measure changes in firms’ incurred financing costs, applying a dummy variable
that takes on the value of 1 if a firm experienced an increase in its rates on bank loans,
overdrafts, or credit lines over the previous six months, and zero otherwise. This measure
covers all firms that have applied for or renewed bank loans over the previous six months.
Thus, SAFE allows us to concentrate on changes in the financing conditions for new
loans. In addition, we construct a categorical variable that equals 1 if a firm experienced
a reduction in its loan rates, 2 if the loan rate remained unchanged, and 3 if it went up.
Table 3 provides information on firms’ financing conditions by country and across
time. It reveals that, across countries, SMEs are affected quite differently. While, on
average, 20 percent of German SMEs in our sample report loan rate increases during the
period 2010W2 - 2013W2, nearly 80 percent of Spanish firms have done so. Overall, small
firms in the GIIPS-countries have suffered much more from loan rate increases than SMEs
in the remaining euro area countries. Regarding the evolution of credit conditions over
time, loan rates increased most broadly in 2011. Since then, fewer firms have experienced
increasing loan rates. Still, about 30 percent of firms in our sample report an increase in
credit costs during the 2013Q4 - 2014Q1 period.
3.2 Macro-Level Data
Cross-border credit. To analyze the effects of credit market fragmentation on firm-level
credit constraints computed using SAFE data, we need semi-annual data on credit inflows
into the euro area countries. We retrieve quarterly data and assign the average of the
second and third quarter to ’wave 1’ for each year. The average across the fourth quarter
of the current year and first quarter of the following year is assigned to ’wave 2’, such
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that both the firm-level and the macroeconomic information is timed equivalently.
In order to measure the direct effect of cross-border bank lending on the financing si-
tuation of firms, we need information on the inflows of credit to the private non-financial
sector for each of the 11 euro area countries included in the sample; ideally this infor-
mation would only concern SMEs. Unfortunately, sectoral breakdowns of cross-border
banking data are still rather scarce. The data closest to our needs are available from the
International Banking Statistics by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). A de-
tailed description of all variables and sources is in the Data Appendix. We use quarterly
country-level information on international bank claims to the non-bank private sector
from the Consolidated Banking Statistics. These claims comprise loans and securities of
all banks reporting to the BIS, consolidated across each bank. Hence, inter-office po-
sitions are netted out. The non-bank private sector includes private firms and private
households, as well as non-bank financial institutions like special purpose vehicles, insu-
rance companies, money market funds and the like. To the best of our knowledge, data
on cross-border bank credit to non-financial firms are currently not publicly available for
our sample period.5 Thus, we take international bank claims against the private non-bank
sector from the Consolidated Banking Statistics as a proxy.
Besides the direct effects of cross-border lending, a retrenchment in credit market
integration can impact the financing conditions of firms indirectly ; for example via the
funding situation of lenders. In order to evaluate the effects of cross-border credit on
financing constraints of SMEs in a broader sense, we use BIS data on total international
bank claims, as well as international claims on banks from the Consolidated Banking
Statistics. Total international bank claims comprise cross-border claims of all reporting
banks against all counterparties (banks, non-bank private sector, public sector) in the
destination country, plus local claims of banks’ foreign affiliates in foreign currency. Given
that the BIS data is published in current USD, we transform the series into EUR using
nominal exchange rates from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and deflate using
consumer price indexes from the IFS to obtain real cross-border bank claims.
Domestic credit. In addition to cross-border credit, we use data on domestic lending as
an explanatory variable. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) present evidence for a "flight home"
effect during the global financial crisis: Banks withdrew capital from abroad and tilted
their loan portfolio more toward domestic lending - independent of the fundamentals in
the home country. Due to the ongoing deleveraging and potential financial protectionism,
this focus on domestic credit markets may persist in the aftermath of the crisis. Thus, the
5However, the BIS has started to provide such information for the most recent quarters.
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reduction in cross-border lending since the crisis may have been compensated in different
euro area countries, at least partially, by increased domestic lending.
To control for such changes in the lending behavior of banks, we include domestic bank
credit to the private non-financial sector from the BIS in the regression model. Again, this
series includes domestic credit to private non-financial corporations, but also to private
households and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs).
Total credit to the private non-financial corporations. In order to evaluate how
changes in loan rates are affected by overall credit, we use The Statistics on Credit to
the Private Non-Financial Sector by the BIS. The dataset provides information on total
credit from all sources, i.e. independent of the type or country of origin of the lender.
Total credit data are available for the entire private non-financial sector (non-financial
corporations, households, and NPISHs), as well as for private non-financial corporations
at quarterly frequency. We use the latter series here.
Figure 4 plots the semi-annual growth rates of the different credit aggregates. In the
aftermath of the crisis, (real) credit to the private sector declined, on average, in our
sample of 11 euro area countries. The upper panel reveals that, on average, domestic
banks have significantly reduced their lending to the private sector - the reductions, as
measured by log-differences, are more pronounced than the reductions in total credit to
the private sector. When looking at the growth rates of cross-border credit, it appears
that euro area credit markets became increasingly segmented through the beginning of
2013. In particular, cross-border claims on banks in the euro area economies were reduced.
This decline in wholesale funding possibilities of euro area banks has contributed to the
reduction in domestic bank credit. At the end of 2013, a modest increase in cross-border
interbank lending could be observed.
3.3 Regression Model
In order to analyze how credit market segmentation in the euro area affects the external
financing costs of SMEs, we proceed as follows. In a first step, we use a linked micro-macro
dataset to estimate a pooled probit model where the dependent variable equals one if a
firm has experienced an increase in its lending rates and zero otherwise. Our explanatory
variables of interest are different credit aggregates. We evaluate the effect of changes in
total credit to non-financial firms and then consider the effects of changes in domestic
and cross-border bank credit separately. The correlogram of the different credit measures
(Table 4) reveals that international bank credit and domestic bank credit to the private
sector are positively (and statistically significantly) correlated in our sample of 11 euro
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area countries, with a correlation coefficient of .31. This may be a first hint at the indirect
channel of international credit market fragmentation: a contraction in cross-border credit
may come with a contraction in domestic bank credit. Moreover, total international credit
is more closely related to movements in cross-border credit to banks than to non-banks,
reflecting the importance of the international interbank linkages of European banks.
Credit market segmentation and the financing cost of firms. Using the micro-
macro data set described above, we model the probability of a firm seeing its loan rate
increase as follows:
Pr[Risct = 1] = αc + θs + λt + β1ForCredct + β2DomCredct + γZct + ξXisct + isct (1)
where Risct is a dichotomous variable that equals one if firm i in country c and sector
s reports a loan rate increase at time t, and zero otherwise, ForCredct is the growth
rate of cross-border credit, and DomCredct is the growth rate of domestic bank credit
to the private sector. Zct is a set of macroeconomic control variables, and Xisct is a set
of firm covariates to control for observable firm-level heterogeneity. In addition, country
dummies (αc), sector (θs), and time dummies (λt) are included in each regression to
control for time-invariant country and sector characteristics as well as for common time
trends in the data. Note that we cannot include firm-level fixed effects as many firms
report to SAFE just once. Dropping all these firms would significantly reduce our sample
size. Therefore, we estimate Eq.(1) using a pooled probit model.
Following the literature, we control for borrower characteristics using information on
firm size, age, turnover, and ownership structure from SAFE. According to previous fin-
dings, we expect a negative link between credit costs and firm size, age, and turnover.
Concerning ownership, firms owned by other firms or by shareholders are expected to be
less credit constrained than those owned by an individual entrepreneur or a family.
As we are interested in the effect of a reduction in cross-border credit supply on firms’
loan rates, one important challenge here is to control for changes in firms’ loan demand.
If loan demand of firm i increases and this is not controlled for, loan rates may increase
(the loan demand curve shifts out), and our estimates are biased upwards. By contrast, if
loan demand is not controlled for and declines, loan rates tend to decline (as loan demand
shifts inwards) so that our estimates are biased downwards. Following Banerjee (2014),
we include a control variable related to firms’ loan demand, namely a dummy variable
that equals one if a firm’s most pressing problem is to find customers. The idea is that
firms should have a lower demand for new credit - and hence a lower likelihood of seeing
their credit conditions tightening - if they have difficulty in selling their products. We
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also include dummies indicating the sector the firm operates in (Construction, Industry,
Services, Trade) in all regressions, because the previous literature shows that the firms’
need for external financing varies significantly by sector (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1998,
Friedrich et al. 2013). In the robustness tests below, we also include sector-time dummies
to control for changes in loan demand at the sector-level.
In terms of macroeconomic control variables, we include aggregate deposit rates, coun-
tries’ interbank dependence, and the change in the number of banks in order to control
for common banking system characteristics. All these variables are retrieved from the
ECB Data Warehouse. We expect a higher probability of a loan rate increase for firms in
countries with higher deposit rates, a higher degree of interbank dependence, and a larger
reduction in the number of banks. Moreover, we add an indicator of economic risk. As
banks have adjusted their risk perceptions in the realm of the crisis, this may imply that
they charged higher risk premia and, hence, loan rates for SME loans. The economic risk
indicator is available from the International Country Risk Guide, a proprietary database
that is also used by firms and banks to assess business risks. It includes information on
GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, as well as the budget balance and the current
account relative to GDP. In addition, we include 5-year sovereign credit default swap
(CDS) spreads to control for differences in sovereign risk, given that our sample period
includes the European sovereign debt crisis. These data are retrieved from Thomson Reu-
ters Datastream.6 Table 5 presents summary statistics for all variables included in the
regression sample.
One problem with this type of micro-macro data and the non-linear probit regression
model is determining the appropriate level at which to cluster standard errors. The
observational unit in our data set is the firm, which is nested within sectors and countries.
Ideally, we would like to cluster at the broadest level, i.e. the country level. However,
cluster-robust estimation relies on the number of clusters going to infinity (Cameron
and Miller 2015). As the number of countries in our sample is small (as is the number of
sectors), we cluster at the firm level. Yet, in robustness tests, we check how the significance
of our results is affected when clustering at the country level.
Running a simple pooled probit model on firms’ loan conditions means that we look
at firms that actually applied for and were granted credit. This implies a non-random
6We also added net interest margins, financial risk, and the ratio of total credit to the private sector
relative to GDP to all regressions. Credit to GDP is often used as a measure of financial development in
large country samples. Yet, it is also a measure of the degree of debt financing and, hence, leverage in an
economy. Yet, including theses additional macro-variables leads to a very high degree of multicollinearity.
That is why we opt for the more parsimonious specification here.
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selection of firms into our regression sample, leading to potentially biased estimates. Firms
that did not apply for a loan – either because they were discouraged or because they
did not need a new loan – may have seen larger increases in loan rates than firms that
received new credit, e.g. due to high fixed costs of using bank credit. In order to take this
potential downward bias of our estimates into account, we also estimate a probit model
with Heckman selection.
Similar to Popov and Udell (2012) and Beck et al. (2014), we model a firm’s decision to
participate in the credit market using a dichotomous variable that equals one if a firm has
applied for a loan and zero otherwise. In the first-stage selection equation of the Heckman
procedure, we regress this dichotomous loan application variable on all regressors included
in the baseline Eq.(1), and on additional variables, as required by the exclusion restriction.
The first additional variable equals one if a firm reports its most pressing problem to be
competition, and zero otherwise. The second variable takes on a value of one if a firm’s
most pressing problem is high labor input costs. For both variables, we expect a negative
relation with loan applications.
Differential effects: The role of firm size. In addition to estimating Eq.(1) with
the probit approaches discussed above, we analyze whether firms of different size are
affected differently by credit market fragmentation. To that aim, we interact all credit
variables with an indicator variable that equals one if a firms has more than 50 employees
(Size50isct), and is, hence, classified as a medium-sized firm, and zero otherwise:
Pr[Risct = 1] = αc + θs + λt + β1ForCredct + β2DomCredct (2)
+ β3ForCredct · Size50isct + β4DomCredct · Size50isct
+ γZct + ξXisct + isct
Even if larger firms are expected to have more favorable financing conditions than smaller
firms that are inherently more opaque and risky, credit market fragmentation may affect
the larger firms in our sample more than smaller ones due to potential direct linkages to
foreign banks or larger reliance on bank credit in general.
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4 Estimation Results
4.1 Credit Growth and Financing Costs of SMEs
Before coming to the effects of credit market fragmentation on loan rate increases for
SMEs, let us look at the first-stage selection equation. Table 6 reveals that larger firms
(both in terms of employees and turnover) are more likely to apply for a loan than smal-
ler ones. Furthermore, firms that are owned by shareholders are less likely to apply for
a bank loan, probably due to the fact that they can resort to other means of financing.
As expected, firms facing strong competition, high labor costs, or weak demand for their
products are less likely to apply for credit. Turning to the macroeconomic control varia-
bles, we find that firms in countries with a higher interbank dependence are more likely
to send out a loan application. We also find some evidence that firms in countries with
higher CDS spreads are less likely to apply for loans.
Table 7 presents the regression results for the increase in loan rates as the dependent
variable. Larger firms, firms owned by shareholders, and firms that have great difficulty
in finding customers are less likely to experience loan rate rises. Older firms tend to be
more likely to see loan rate increases. Regarding the macroeconomic drivers of firms’
credit costs, firms from countries with higher interbank dependence are more likely to
experience loan rate increases. As expected, the higher the average deposit rate and,
hence, bank’s funding costs or the higher the economic risk at the country-level, the
higher the probability of a loan rate increase for a given firm. The larger the reduction in
the number of banks serving a firm’s home country and, hence, the lower contestability
in the credit market, the higher is the probability of a loan rate increase.
Regarding the different credit measures, we find that larger reductions in total credit
to non-financial firms make loan rate increases more likely − both in the probit model and
in the model with Heckmann selection (columns 1 and 2). When considering domestic
and cross-border credit separately, we find that only international bank credit growth has
a negative and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of increasing loan rates for
SMEs. The direct effect of domestic credit growth is statistically insignificant. Columns
5 and 6 reveals that the negative effect of cross-border credit is driven by cross-border
bank loans: the stronger the reduction in cross-border credit to banks, the higher the
probability of increasing loan rates. By contrast, changes in cross-border credit to non-
banks do not seem to matter for changes in the financing costs of SMEs. This may be
due to the fact that direct foreign lending is less important for SMEs’ external financing
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situation than lending by domestic banks.7 Thus, credit market fragmentation in the
interbank market seems to have a more detrimental effect on the financing costs of SMEs
than the reduction in direct cross-border lending to firms. This finding is in line with the
empirical results of Iyer et al. (2014) for Portugal.
Table 8 presents the regression results for interactions between the credit variables
and a dummy variable that equals one for firms with more than 50 employees. Again,
the relation between credit growth and firms’ likelihood of loan rate increases is negative
and statistically significant. For the larger firms in our sample, the negative impact of
a reduction in total credit and in total international credit is larger than for the smaller
firms. Moreover, larger firms are more likely to experience higher borrowing costs, the
stronger is the reduction in cross-border credit to their home country banks. The effects
of credit market segmentation might be more pronounced for larger firms as the latter
typically receive more (cross-border) credit than the smaller firms.
4.2 Economic Significance
In order to get an idea about the magnitudes of the above identified linkages between
credit growth and the probability of loan rate increases, we now discuss and interpret the
marginal effects from our regressions in greater detail. Given that the probit estimator
is non-linear, the marginal effects of the independent variables in the model are non-
constant. They vary with changes in the predictors.
When considering an average firm in an average credit market (all variables are set at
their sample means), our results indicate that the probability of a loan rate increase faced
by this firm is 65% in the 2010 - 2014 period(based on the model from column (2), Table
7).8 Yet, this probability rises by 7 percentage points, up to 72%, if total credit growth
is at the sample minimum (-.07) and all other predictors remain at the sample means.
If total credit growth is at its maximum (.04), the probability of an average firm seeing
its loan rate increase drops to 60% though. Overall, the probability of facing higher loan
rates varies by 12 percentage points, depending on total credit growth in the country the
firm operates in.
Repeating the same exercise for the effect of international credit growth, our results
7Moreover, this credit aggregate includes not only cross-boder credit to SMEs, but also to non-bank
financials and households, for example.
8We base our discussion of marginal effects on our preferred regression setup with Heckman selection
here. However, the results based on the simple probit model are qualitatively the same.
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indicate even larger effects: Here, the difference between the likelihood of loan rate in-
creases in countries with the highest (.23) and the lowest growth (-.32) in international
credit is 15 percentage points. Thus, the effect of a retrenchment in international credit
on firms’ loan rates is not only statistically, but also economically meaningful. Further,
when comparing these marginal effects to those of firm-level characteristics, the impact
of credit growth is important. For example, when computing marginal effects across the
different classes of turnover and keeping all other variables at their sampl means, the
probability of firm-level loan rate increases varies between 64 and 66% only.
Figure 5 plots average adjusted predictions (AAPs) for different credit aggregates,
based on the regression models using the Heckman selection approach. It illustrates that
the probability of firms seeing their loan rates increase is higher, the larger the reduction
in credit is - both for total and for the different international credit variables.
4.3 Robustness Tests
We run several alternative regressions in order to test the robustness of the results discus-
sed above. Table 9 shows that adding a control group for large firms, i.e. firms with more
than 250 employees, does not weaken our main results. Rather, it strengthens the result
that the retrenchment in cross-border bank credit negatively affects, in particular, larger
firms’ cost of credit in the sample. Furthermore, dropping individual firm-level variables
from the model or including a set of sector-and-time dummies does not affect our results.9
Moreover, when clustering robust standard errors at the country level instead of at the
firm level, our results remain statistically significant. Changes in inflation are not expli-
citly considered by firms reporting loan rate changes. In order to rule out that our results
are driven by changes in inflation, we include CPI inflation as an additional regressor.
As expected, the estimation results reveal that if inflation rises, nominal interest rates on
new loans are more likely to also rise, although the results are mostly not statistically
significant. Still, the introduction of CPI inflation in the regression model does not alter
our previous findings.
Second, we run ordered probit regressions where the dependent categorical variable is
assigned a value of 1 if a firm’s loan rate decreased over the past six months, a value of 2
if the loan rate was unchanged, and a value of 3 if the loan rate increased. The ordered
probit regressions support our previous results that reductions in aggregate credit make
9We do not report all the robustness tests. The respective tables are available from the authors upon
request.
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loan rate increases more likely (and loan rate reductions less likely). Moreover, in this
setup, the relationship between cross-border credit to non-banks and the likelihood of
loan rate increases at the firm-level is negative and statistically significant. Hence, when
differentiating between positive and negative loan rate changes, the estimation results
suggest that fragmentation in the international market for credit to non-banks coincides
with increased external financing costs for SMEs - even if direct foreign credit is not as
important for SMEs as domestic credit.
Third, we aggregate SAFE-data for each country at the sector-level and estimate the
following aggregate version of Eq.(1) using a fractional probit model, where the dependent
variable is bound between zero and one:
ShareRsct = αc + θs + λt + υst + β1ForCredct + β2DomCredct + γZct + sct (3)
ShareRsct is the share of firms in sector s and country c at time t that reported a loan
rate increase. All time-varying, sector-specific factors, like changes in credit demand or
sectoral business conditions, are controlled for by sector-time fixed effects (υst). As in the
baseline specification, we also add sector, time, and country fixed effects. Apart from this,
we include the same time-varying country-level variables as in the baseline regressions.
While some of the macroeconomic control variables do not significantly affect the
sectoral share of firms with higher financing costs, Table 10 confirms our previous results
that a retrenchment in international credit leads to a deterioration of firms’ borrowing
costs. The sectoral version of the regression model corroborates the role of the interbank
channel for firms’ financing costs.
Finally, we evaluate endogeneity issues. Our findings point to a negative link between
aggregate credit growth and the probability of loan rate increases at the firm-level. It is
unlikely that this result is driven by reverse causality, because increasing loan rates in a
destination country of credit should make it more attractive for banks to lend. Thus, we
would expect the effect of loan rate increases on credit growth to be positive or insignifi-
cant. Moreover, individual firm-level developments should not drive aggregate variables
(Langfield and Pagano 2015), especially when looking at small firms.
Potential instrumental variables for cross-border credit, like changes in the regulation
of foreign bank entry, institutional changes, or creditor rights, are very similar in the
countries considered here and do not vary much across the period 2010-2014. Still, we
check whether categorical variables measuring the implementation of stricter capital and
other regulatory requirements, taken from the prudential policy database developed by
Cerutti et al. (2016), could be used to instrument aggregate credit variables in our sample.
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After selecting those potential instruments that do not seem to suffer from a weak instru-
ments problem, we test for the exogeneity of the potentially endogenous credit aggregates.
Yet, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, so that the probit model without
instrumenting aggregate credit is the preferred specification here.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to shed light on real consequences of credit market fragmentation
in the euro area since the crisis. SMEs in the euro area continue to receive special
attention from policy makers, not least with regard to the design of the Capital Markets
Union (CMU), as they were hit the hardest by the credit crunch during the crisis.
So far, the literature on the financing constraints of firms in the euro area concentrates
on the importance of firm characteristics for credit conditions of firms. Yet, how the
structural changes in cross-border banking affect the access of SMEs to finance is not yet
investigated. This study is a first step in filling this gap. Using a linked micro-macro panel
data set, we examine the link between the retrenchment in cross-border bank lending and
the evolution of financing costs for SMEs in the euro area.
Our paper has three main findings. First, we find that reductions in cross-border bank
lending made loan rate increases for SMEs more likely. The effects are meaningful, both
in statistical and in economic senses. For firms in countries with the strongest reductions
in international credit, the probability of facing higher loan rates is 15 percentage points
higher than for firms in countries with the most favorable evolution of international credit.
Second, the larger the retrenchment in cross-border lending to banks was, the higher the
likelihood that SMEs saw their credit costs rise. Thus, the negative link between total
cross-border credit growth and the financing costs for firms seems to be driven by the
interbank lending channel. Yet, we do not find a significant and consistent effect of
direct cross-border lending to non-banks on SMEs financing costs. Third, we can show
that, in particular, the larger European enterprises included here have suffered from the
fragmentation of international credit markets.
Overall, our results show that cross-border lending does indeed affect the access to
finance for SMEs, though mostly indirectly through the interbank channel. To alleviate
financing constraints for SMEs, one important factor is thus credit market integration.
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Figures
Figure 1: Change in the availability of bank loans for SMEs
This figure plots the net weighted percentage of responses (increased - decreased). The data are available
from SAFE by the ECB. W denotes the waves of the survey.
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Figure 2: Loan rate spreads in the euro area
This figure plots the difference between interest rates on small and large loans (percentage points) in the
euro area. The data are available from the MFI Interest Rate Statistics by the ECB.
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Figure 3: Firms’ most pressing problem
This figure plots the most pressing problem named by firms in SAFE (weighted). The euro area sample
includes the 11 countries used in this paper. Representative country-level results are available for France,
Germany, Spain, and Italy.
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Figure 4: Log-changes in real credit
This figure plots the sample means of the change in total, domestic and cross-border credit. All credit
series are available from the BIS. The timing of the variables corresponds to the SAFE waves.
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Figure 5: Marginal effects of credit growth
This figure plots the average adjusted predictions (AAPs) for different values of total and international
credit growth, based on Table 7, columns (2) and (4), respectively. The gray areas reflect 95% confidence
bands.
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Tables
Table 1: SAFE country composition
This table gives the number of firms by year and wave in our sample.
Year and wave
Country 2010W2 2011W1 2011W2 2012W1 2012W2 2013W1 2013W2
Austria 393 363 349 370 372 376 347
Belgium 410 399 414 395 402 397 414
Germany 792 661 683 711 641 649 644
Finland 432 442 416 349 384 373 371
France 784 774 760 767 736 762 783
Greece 362 418 397 361 356 325 362
Ireland 381 355 344 338 352 354 370
Italy 753 685 659 734 621 686 655
Netherlands 401 402 404 381 383 378 393
Portugal 400 406 399 394 410 383 347
Spain 721 706 699 709 699 705 699
Total 5,829 5,611 5,524 5,509 5,356 5,388 5,385
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Table 2: Firm characteristics
This table gives the number of firms according to different firm characteristics provided by SAFE.
Frequency Percent
Employment (categories)
From 1 employee to 9 employees 14,514 37.60
From 10 employees to 49 employees 14,533 37.65
From 50 employees to 249 employees 9,555 24.75
Main activity
Industry 9,622 24.93
Construction 4,125 10.69
Trade 10,715 27.76
Services 14,140 36.63
Annual turnover
Up to e 2 million 21,031 54.48
More than e 2 million and up to e 10 million 11,213 29.05
More than e 10 million and up to e 50 million 6,358 16.47
Age of the firm
10 years or more 30,556 79.16
5 years or more but less than 10 years 5,176 13.41
2 years or more but less than 5 years 2,409 6.24
Less than 2 years 461 1.19
Main owner of the firm
Public shareholders, as your company is 1,109 2.87
Family or entrepreneurs 21,939 56.83
Other firms or business associates 3,915 10.14
Venture capital firms or business angel 443 1.15
A natural person, one owner only 10,564 27.37
Other 632 1.64
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Table 3: Loan rate increases by country and time
This table presents the share of firms that have experienced loan rate increases in our sample.
Year and wave
Country 2010W2 2011W1 2011W2 2012W1 2012W2 2013W1 2013W2 Total
Austria 0.44 0.65 0.41 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.37
Belgium 0.57 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.23 0.37
Finland 0.46 0.30 0.26 0.44 0.60 0.77 0.52 0.49
France 0.46 0.59 0.51 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.34
Germany 0.37 0.44 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.20
Greece 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.66 0.47 0.55 0.34 0.67
Ireland 0.73 0.82 0.64 0.52 0.49 0.40 0.34 0.57
Italy 0.61 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.68 0.61 0.52 0.68
Netherlands 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.43 0.68 0.38 0.27 0.46
Portugal 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.27 0.62
Spain 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.72 0.45 0.77
Total 0.57 0.66 0.55 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.47
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Table 4: Correlogram: Log-change in credit measures
This table presents correlations between the log-difference of different credit measures. The first row of
each credit measure reports the correlation coefficient. ∗ denotes statistical significance at the 5%-level.
The second row shows p-values, while the third row reports the number of observations.
Total credit to
firms
Domestic bank
credit to private
sector
Total internati-
onal claims
International
claims to non-
banks
Domestic bank credit 0.25* 1(0.03)
77 77
Total international claims 0.08 0.31* 1(0.47) (0.01)
77 77 77
Int. claims to non-banks 0.06 0.10 0.41* 1(0.63) (0.37) (0.00)
77 77 77 77
Int. claims to banks 0.01 0.24* 0.80* 0.02(0.94) (0.03) (0.00) (0.88)
77 77 77 77
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Table 5: Summary statistics
This table gives summary statistics for the baseline regression sample.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sample of firms with information on loan rate changes
Firm size 14,395 2.02 0.78 1 3
Firm age 14,395 3.72 0.62 1 4
Turnover 14,395 1.74 0.77 1 3
Ownership 14,395 0.13 0.34 0 1
Most pressing pb: Finding customers 14,395 0.21 0.41 0 1
Most pressing pb: Labor cost 14,395 0.14 0.35 0 1
Most pressing pb: Competition 14,395 0.11 0.31 0 1
Deposit rate, % 14,395 2.52 0.63 1.03 4.51
Interbank dependence, % of assets 14,395 14.39 6.31 6.64 31.14
Growth in number of banks 14,395 -3.71 6.35 -32.00 2.50
Economic risk 14,395 -35.98 3.50 -43.71 -26.50
CDS Spread 14,395 7.03 25.72 0.12 149.04
Total credit to firms, log-diff 14,395 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.04
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff 14,395 -0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.06
Total international credit, log-diff 14,395 -0.03 0.08 -0.32 0.23
International credit to non-banks, log-diff 14,395 -0.02 0.07 -0.37 0.14
International credit to banks, log-diff 14,395 -0.05 0.20 -1.01 1.11
Full sample
Firm size 38,602 1.87 0.78 1 3
Firm age 38,602 3.71 0.64 1 4
Turnover 38,602 1.62 0.75 1 3
Ownership 38,602 0.15 0.35 0 1
Most pressing pb: Finding customers 38,602 0.24 0.43 0 1
Most pressing pb: Labor cost 38,602 0.14 0.34 0 1
Most pressing pb: Competition 38,602 0.13 0.34 0 1
Deposit rate, % 38,602 2.50 0.66 1.03 4.51
Interbank dependence, % of assets 38,602 14.80 6.66 6.64 31.14
Growth in number of banks 38,602 -3.79 6.47 -32.00 2.50
Economic risk 38,602 -36.29 3.74 -43.71 -26.50
CDS Spread 38,602 8.26 28.91 0.12 149.04
Total credit to firms, log-diff 38,602 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.04
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff 38,602 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.06
Total international credit, log-diff 38,602 -0.03 0.09 -0.32 0.23
International credit to non-banks, log-diff 38,602 -0.02 0.07 -0.37 0.14
International credit to banks, log-diff 38,602 -0.05 0.22 -1.01 1.11
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Table 6: Determinants of loan application
This table reports estimation results (average marginal effects) from the first-stage estimation of a probit
with selection. The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm has applied for a loan. Credit aggregates are
expressed as log-differences. A set of country, sector, and time dummies is included in each regression.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the
10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3)
Firm size 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm age -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Turnover 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ownership -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.079***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.099***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Most pressing pb: Competition -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Most pressing pb: Labor cost -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Deposit rate, % -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.005** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Growth in number of banks -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CDS Spread -0.000** -0.000* -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to firms, log-diff 0.453***
(0.173)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff 0.14 0.093
(0.142) (0.144)
Total international credit, log-diff -0.01
(0.040)
International credit to non-banks, log-diff -0.073
(0.047)
International credit to banks, log-diff 0.008
(0.014)
Country dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes
Observations 38602 38602 38602
No. of firms 26032 26032 26032
Pseudo R-squared 0.065 0.064 0.064
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Table 7: Determinants of loan rate increases
This table reports estimation results (average marginal effects) from pooled probit regressions, with and
without a Heckman selection approach. The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm reports an increase
in its loan rate. Credit aggregates are expressed as log-differences. A set of country, sector and time
dummies is included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ∗,∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Heckman Probit Heckman Probit Heckman
Firm size 0.005 -0.015* 0.004 -0.016** 0.004 -0.016**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Firm age 0.011* 0.012* 0.011* 0.012* 0.011* 0.012*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Turnover 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ownership -0.035*** -0.011 -0.035*** -0.011 -0.035*** -0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.030*** -0.009 -0.032*** -0.01 -0.032*** -0.01
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Deposit rate, % 0.042** 0.044*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.006* 0.009** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Growth in number of banks -0.003*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.011** 0.018*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CDS Spread 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to firms, log-diff -1.536*** -1.536***
(0.272) (0.261)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff -0.196 -0.221 -0.096 -0.117
(0.241) (0.227) (0.244) (0.230)
Total international credit, log-diff -0.281*** -0.255***
(0.067) (0.063)
International credit to non-banks, log-diff -0.125 -0.095
(0.077) (0.073)
International credit to banks, log-diff -0.068*** -0.065***
(0.023) (0.022)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14395 14395 14395 14395 14395 14395
No. of firms 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.092 0.168 0.092 0.168 0.091
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Table 8: Determinants of loan rate increases, interactions with firm size
This table reports estimation results (average marginal effects) from pooled probit regressions, with and
without a Heckman selection approach. The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm reports an increase
in its loan rate. Credit aggregates are expressed as log-differences. A set of country, sector, and time
dummies is included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ∗,∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Heckman Probit Heckman Probit Heckman
Firm age 0.012* 0.011* 0.012* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Turnover 0.01 -0.004 0.012* -0.003 0.012* -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ownership -0.034*** -0.009 -0.034*** -0.01 -0.034*** -0.01
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.030*** -0.006 -0.031*** -0.007 -0.031*** -0.007
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Larger firms -0.011 -0.024** -0.018 -0.030** -0.014 -0.027**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Deposit rate, % 0.041** 0.042*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.006* 0.009** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Growth in number of banks -0.003*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.011** 0.018*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CDS Spread 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to firms, log-diff -1.229*** -1.254***
(0.294) (0.276)
Total credit to firms x Larger firms -1.095*** -0.946**
(0.395) (0.371)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff -0.094 -0.164 0.011 -0.058
(0.253) (0.234) (0.256) (0.237)
Total credit by domestic banks x Larger firms -0.481 -0.319 -0.451 -0.28
(0.319) (0.301) (0.322) (0.304)
Total international credit, log-diff -0.209*** -0.182***
(0.072) (0.067)
Total international credit x Larger firms -0.265*** -0.257***
(0.101) (0.094)
International credit to non-banks, log-diff -0.093 -0.062
(0.086) (0.080)
International credit to non-banks x Larger firms -0.086 -0.079
(0.114) (0.106)
International credit to banks, log-diff -0.043* -0.037
(0.025) (0.023)
International credit to banks x Larger firms -0.096** -0.105***
(0.042) (0.039)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14395 38602 14395 38602 14395 38602
No. of firms 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.089 0.169 0.089 0.168 0.089
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Table 9: Determinants of loan rate increases, including large firms
This table reports estimation results (average marginal effects) from pooled probit regressions, including
large firms (i.e. firms with more than 250 employees), with and without a Heckman selection approach.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm reports an increase in its loan rate. Credit aggregates are
expressed as log-differences. A set of country, sector, and time dummies is included in each regression.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the
10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Heckman Probit Heckman Probit Heckman
Firm size 0.003 -0.017** 0.003 -0.018** 0.003 -0.018**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Firm age 0.012* 0.013** 0.012* 0.012** 0.012* 0.012**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Turnover 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ownership -0.038*** -0.013 -0.038*** -0.013 -0.038*** -0.014
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.031*** -0.011 -0.033*** -0.012 -0.032*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Deposit rate, % 0.037** 0.039** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.006* 0.009** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Growth in number of banks -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.018*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CDS Spread 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to firms, log-diff -1.606*** -1.611***
(0.269) (0.260)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff -0.175 -0.196 -0.062 -0.077
(0.238) (0.225) (0.242) (0.229)
Total international credit, log-diff -0.297*** -0.272***
(0.066) (0.063)
International credit to non-banks, log-diff -0.122 -0.091
(0.076) (0.073)
International credit to banks, log-diff -0.071*** -0.068***
(0.023) (0.022)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14878 14878 14878 14878 14878 14878
No. of firms 11197 11197 11197 11197 11197 11197
Pseudo R-squared 0.167 0.063 0.167 0.062 0.166 0.062
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Table 10: Determinants of loan rate increases, sector level
This table reports estimation results from fractional probit regressions. The dependent variable is the
share of firms in sector s, country c at time t that report an increase in loan rates. Credit aggregates
are expressed as log-differences. A set of country, sector, time and sector-time dummies is included in
each regression. Estimations are conducted using robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3)
Deposit rate, % 0.069 0.12 0.093
(0.078) (0.082) (0.082)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.035** 0.021 0.021
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Growth in number of banks -0.007 -0.016*** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Economic risk 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.074***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
CDS Spread 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total credit to firms, log-diff -4.339***
(1.179)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diff -1.014 -0.667
(1.029) (1.088)
Total international credit, log-diff -0.920***
(0.244)
International credit to non-banks, log-diff -0.123
(0.368)
International credit to banks, log-diff -0.202**
(0.086)
Country dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes
Sector-wave dummies yes yes yes
Observations 308 308 308
No. of countries 11 11 11
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.132
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Data Appendix
Variable Source Description
Costs of financing
Increase in lending rates
SAFE 1: increased
Q10, a): Have lending rates for your
firms increased, decreased or remained
the same over the past 6 months?
missing: DK/NA
0: otherwise
Firm characteristics
Firm size
SAFE Categorical variable
D1: How many people does your com-
pany employ(part- or full time)?
1: 1-9 employees
2: 10 - 49 employees
3: 50 - 249 employees
4: 250 employees or more
Firm age
SAFE Categorical variable
D5: In which year was your firm registe-
red?
1: less than 2 years
2: 2 years or more, less than 5 years
3: 5 years or more, less than 10 years
4: 10 years or more
Sector
SAFE Categorical variable
D3: What is the main activity of your
company?
1: Construction
2: Industry (Mining, Manufacturing)
3: Services (Transport, Real Estate, Ot-
her Services)
4: Trade (Wholesale and Retail)
Missing: D3>7
Turnover
SAFE Categorical variable
D4: What was annual turnover of your
company last year?
1: up to 2 mio e
2: over 2 and up to 10 mio e
3: over 10 and up to 50 mio e
4: over 50 mio e
Missing: DK/NA
Firm ownership
SAFE 1: Shareholders, other firms, other
D6: Who are the owners of your firm? 0: family or entrepreneurs, venture capi-
tal firms, natural person, one owner only
missing: DK/NA
Most pressing problem: finding customers
SAFE 1: Finding customers
Waves until 2012W1 0: all other categories (Access to finance,
competition, costs of production or la-
bor, availability of skilled stuff or expe-
rienced managers, regulation, other)
Q0: What is currently your most pres-
sing problem?
missing: DK/NA and missings from Q0
Waves as of 2012W2
Construct Q0 from Q0b and Q0c
Most pressing problem: input costs
SAFE 1: Costs of production or labour
Waves until 2012W1 0: all other categories (Finding cus-
tomers, competition, access to finance,
availability of skilled stuff or experienced
managers, regulation, other)
Q0: What is currently your most pres-
sing problem?
missing: DK/NA and missings from Q0
Waves as of 2012W2
Construct Q0 from Q0b and Q0c
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Most pressing problem: competition
SAFE 1: Competition
Waves until 2012W1 0: all other categories (Finding custo-
mers, access to finance, availability of
skilled stuff or experienced managers, re-
gulation, costs of production or labor, ot-
her)
Q0: What is currently your most pres-
sing problem?
missing: DK/NA and missings from Q0
Waves as of 2012W2
Construct Q0 from Q0b and Q0c
Total credit
Total credit to private
non-financial firms
BIS, Statistics on credit to the private
non-financial sector
Credit to non-financial corporations
from all sources independent of the
country of origin or type of lender. This
includes e.g. securitised credits held by
the non-bank financial sector or cross-
border lending. The coverage of financial
instruments includes loans and debt se-
curities. Adjusted for breaks, billions of
local currency (EUR), original frequency:
quarterly
Cross-border credit
Total international
cross-border bank claims
BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics Claims (amounts outstanding at quar-
ter end) on destination country by all
reporting countries, immediate borro-
wer basis, in mio. USD, international
claims (cross-border + local in foreign
currency), original frequency: quarterly
International cross-
border bank claims on
non-bank private
sector
BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics Claims on destination country by all
reporting countries, immediate borro-
wer basis, in mio. USD, international
claims (cross-border + local in foreign
currency), non-bank private sector inclu-
des claims against all non-banks (i.e. in-
cluding financial non-banks and house-
holds), original frequency: quarterly
International cross-
border bank claims on
banking sector
BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics Claims on destination country banks by
all reporting countries, immediate borro-
wer basis, in mio. USD, foreign claims
(cross-border + local in foreign cur-
rency), original frequency: quarterly
Domestic credit
Domestic bank credit to
private non-financial
sector (non-financial
corporations, house-
holds, NPISHs)
BIS, Statistics on credit to the private
non-financial sector
Credit extended by domestic deposit-
taking corporations except the central
bank such as commercial banks, sa-
vings banks or credit unions and money-
market funds, adjusted for breaks, billi-
ons of local currency (EUR), original fre-
quency: quarterly.
Other macro variables
Euro-Dollar nominal ex-
change rate
IMF, IFS Euro per USD, end of period, original fre-
quency: quarterly
Consumer price index IMF, IFS All items, index 2010 = 100, original fre-
quency: quarterly
Gross domestic product Eurostat In current mio EUR, according to ESTV
2010, original frequency: quarterly
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Deposit interest rate ECB, MFI Interest Rate Statistics Interest rate on deposits with agreed
maturity, annualized agreed rate, coun-
terpart sector: non-financial corporati-
ons and households, original frequency:
monthly
Interbank dependence ECB, Statistics on Consolidated Banking
Data
Interbank market dependence in % of to-
tal assets, domestic banks and foreign
controlled subsidiaries and branches, ori-
ginal frequency: half-yearly
Number of banks ECB, Statistics on Consolidated Banking
Data
Total number of credit institutions, do-
mestic banks and foreign controlled
subsidiaries and branches, original fre-
quency: half-yearly
Economic risk International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), PRS Group
Economic risk rating, based on different
risk components (GDP per capita, GDP
growth, inflation, fiscal budget balance,
current account balance), original fre-
quency: yearly
CDS spreads Thomson Reiters Datastream 5-year sovereign credit default swap spre-
ads, original frequency: daily
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